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1 Introduction
The early contributions of Gini and Lorenz have shaped the way the whole
subject of the income-distribution analysis has developed (Gini 1912, Lorenz
1905). Yet, over the last three or four decades, the Gini-Lorenz insights have
been largely reinterpreted using the welfare-based approaches pioneered by
Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969) taking their cue from the early work by
Dalton (1920). This explicitly welfarist approach to the analysis of income
distribution has inuenced the development of research methodology and
practical policy tools.
However, it is clear that a welfarist approach may not be necessary or
even desirable: some have di¢ culty with issues such as the type of social
consensus that supposedly underpins a social-welfare function; others may
feel that coherent statements can be made about inequality comparisons
without any reference to welfare. So alternative approaches to the subject
have used analogies with information theory or on an explicit axiomatisation
of inequality that does not use the device of the social-welfare function.1
More recent work has attempted to reconsider the fundamental nature
of income inequality and to examine the meaning of particular concepts in
distributional analysis that lie outside the territory familiar social-welfare
analysis and information theory. Typically these focus on income di¤erences
rather than on individual income levels. The purpose of this paper is to
draw together results from a number of these recent contributions, to show
the relationships between them and related work on deprivation and poverty,
and to discuss the relationship with the original insights by Gini and Lorenz.
2 The setting
Let us begin by setting out a simplied framework of analysis for discussing
the interconnected topics that form the theme of this paper. For present
purposes it is convenient to work with a xed, nite population of economic
agents who are identical in every respect other than income. The analysis
can be extended to other empirically relevant cases by, for example, adjust-
ing income using an equivalence scale and reweighting family units accord-
ingly. Also, for many of the measures, we could easily use a more general
distribution-function approach to present the results.
1See for example Theil (1967) on information theory, Bourguignon (1979), Cowell
(1980), Shorrocks (1980) on axiomatic approaches.
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2.1 Population and income
Consider a given population of individuals
N := f1; :::; ng :
For each individual i there is an exogenously determined quantity to be
known as income,xi.
The income distribution in the population is given by an n-vector
x := (x1; x2; :::; xn) :
Let R denote the set of real numbers and let 
n be the set of ordered n-
vectors:

n := fx : x 2 Rn; x1  x2  :::  xng (1)
We may consider x to be taken from a connected subset D of 
n: one possi-
bility is that D is the set of non-negative (ordered) n-vectors. This would be
appropriate if incomeis to be dened in a way that automatically rules out
negative numbers; for example if incomewere in reality expenditure then
it would be natural to assume xi  0. Some approaches choose to focus on
a concept of individual welfare or utility which may, perhaps, be taken as a
simple transform of individual income, in which case all that is required is a
reinterpretation of D.2 Given the precise specication of D one can then, for
example, represent inequality, poverty and other indices as functions from D
to R.
The methodology broadly consists in setting out a fairly parsimonious
set of axioms that characterise the essential tools of distributional analysis.
These tools can be summarised as:
 Evaluation functions. Perhaps the best known example of such a func-
tion is the Gini coe¢ cient itself. This is one representative of a wide
class that includes social-welfare functions, poverty measures and in-
equality measures.
 Ranking criteria. The prime example here is obviously the set of
second-order ranking criteria associated with the Lorenz curve.
2However, this is not an innocuous assumption. Individual utility may well be a func-
tion of other peoples incomes or utilities as well, in which case the relationship between
simple properties of oredrergins and welfare properties may no longer hold  see Amiel
and Cowell (1994).
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More specically the idea is to nd, for any specic problem in distribu-
tional analysis, a set of axioms that appropriately capture the principles that
have an intuitive or ethical appeal for the problem in question and then to
show that this specic set of axioms is necessary and su¢ cient for a particular
evaluation function or ranking criterion to satisfy the stated principles.
2.2 The axiomatic approach
It might seem that the axiomatic approach is somewhat arbitrary. However,
one of the arguments of this paper is that there is a commonality of axioms
across a number of topics that yield important insights on the connections
between various principles of distributional analysis.
To begin with there are a few basic axioms that are frequently invoked
to dene the structure of evaluation functions and rankings. They are used
so frequently that it makes sense to state a version of them here, before we
have examined any of the specic distributional issues.
Let  be some evaluation function used for comparing income distribu-
tions, let ,  be scalars and 1 2 Rn denote the vector (1; 1; :::; 1).
Axiom 1 (Continuity)  is a continuous function D! R.
Axiom 2 (Linear homogeneity) For all x 2 D,  > 0
 (x) =  (x)
Axiom 3 (Translation invariance) For all x;x+ 1 2 D
 (x+ 1) =  (x)
Axioms 1 to 3 can readily be adapted to the characterisation of ranking
criteria rather than evaluation functions. These axioms, or modications
of them, endow the evaluation function  with a structure that turns out
to be very useful for building a variety of tools for distributional analysis.
Consider the use of these in characterising a familiar inequality index. The
absolute Gini coe¢ cient
IAG (x) :=
1
n2
nX
i=1
nX
j=i+1
[xj   xi] (2)
has contours as illustrated in Figure 1. The triangular area is the simplex
with the centroid 1 = (1; 1; 1) at which there is perfect equality. Let point x
be some arbitrary income distribution; by Axiom 1, along any path from x
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to 1 inequality continuously (but not necessarily monotonically) approaches
the value of perfect equality, conventionally normalised at 0; a point x lying
along the ray through x such that x = x will represent a distribution with
inequality IAG (x) (Axiom 2); a point lying along a line through x parallel
to the ray through 1 represents a distribution with the same inequality as x
(Axiom 3).
x1
x3
x2
0
•
x*•
1
Figure 1: Contour map for the Gini, n = 3
What about ethical criteria such as the transfer principle? There are
two approaches that have been adopted in the literature. The rst is to
build such a requirement in as an explicit principle for . The second, and
perhaps more satisfactory, is to allow it emerge from the axiomatic structure:
here the idea is to allow the structural axioms and other essential properties
to characterise a general class of functions to which  belongs and then to
consider the members of this class that may satisfy the particular ethical
principle.
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3 Deprivation
Income di¤erences lie at the heart of the Gini approach to inequality. They
are also central to the concept of relative deprivationthat has its origins
in sociology (Runciman 1966). In the economics context the concept of de-
privation can be seen as emerging naturally from the relationship between
inequality measures and social-welfare functions. There are also intuitive and
formal connections between deprivation and poverty analysis; in fact depri-
vation is structurally similar to the problem poverty measurement which we
will briey consider rst.
3.1 Poverty
Sens approach to poverty (Sen 1976, 1979) makes the connection between
poverty and deprivation explicit. His approach also assists the present discus-
sion by making clear two key components of the problem: the identication
of the poor and the aggregation of information about the poor. The aggre-
gation of information can be into a single poverty index (an example of an
evaluation function) or into a poverty ranking.
The question of income can be considered to lie outside the scope of the
present discussion although in any application the distinction between, say,
total family income and consumption expenditure may be crucial for the
identication of issue. Here income is just the quantity x used in section 2.
3.1.1 Identication and the reference point
The denition of a poverty line is a particularly convenient device because it
automatically denes a reference point. Given a specic poverty line z 2 R+
we can introduce the concept of the poverty gap for any person i
gi (x; z) =

z   xi if xi  z
0 otherwise:
: (3)
The poverty gap concept plays a central rôle in Sens approach and is
also at the heart of the Foster et al. (1984) analysis that developed the family
of poverty indices (evaluation functions) given by
1
n
nX
i=1

gi (x; z)
z

(4)
where  is a sensitivity index.
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Let us dene the cumulative poverty gap as
Gi (x; z) :=
1
n
iX
j=1
gj (x; z) ; i = 1; 2; :::; n (5)
This then yields a key concept used for the purposes of ranking the TIP
curve (Jenkins and Lambert 1997) or poverty prole (Shorrocks 1998). This
curve is formed by joining the points
 
i
n
; Gi (x; z)

and must be increasing
and concave.
3.1.2 Axiomatic approach
The seminal paper by Sen (1976) was remarkable for its introduction of the
Gini coe¢ cient into the analysis of poverty. It is clear that this emerges from
the specic assumptions that Sen introduced about the nature of poverty
including an explicit introduction of an assumption that the weight to be
placed on the gap gi (x; z) in the aggregation process is to be proportional to
i itself i.e. proportional to is position in the income distribution.
However, an alternative approach to the axiomatisation of poverty has
been provided by Ebert andMoyes (2002). The approach e¤ectively examines
the structure of rankings on n + 1 incomes  the n incomes of the agents
(x1; x2; :::; xn) plus the poverty line z. They use Axioms 1 and 3 but replace
Axiom 2 with scale invariance so that
P (x; z) = P (x; z) (6)
where P is the ordinal function representing the poverty ranking. In addition
the following axioms are required where, for convenience we dene p as the
number of of people who are poor:
p (x; z) := # fi : xi  zg
Axiom 4 (Focus) For x 2 D and xi > z P is constant in xi:
Axiom 5 (Monotonicity) For x 2 D and xi  z P is strictly decreasing
in xi:
Axiom 6 (Independence) Let x, y 2 D be such that P (x; z) = P (y; z),
and xj = yj for all j  p (x; z). Then, for any i  p (x; z), and any x such
that xi 1  x  xi+1
P (x1; x2; :::; xi 1; x; xi+1:::; xn; z) = P (y1; y2; :::; yi 1; x; yi+1:::; yn; z)
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Then, Ebert and Moyes (2002) show the following:
Theorem 1 Given Axioms 1, 3, 4-6, and the scale-invariance property (6)
the function P representing the poverty ranking must satisfy
'
 
1
n
nX
i=1

gi (x; z)
z

; z
!
(7)
or
'
 
1
n
nX
i=1
gi (x; z)
 ; z
!
(8)
where  > 0 and ' is continuous and increasing in its rst argument.
Clearly (7) is just a transformation of the Foster et al. (1984) index (4),
while (8) is an absolutecounterpart of the relativeindex (4).3
3.2 Individual deprivation
The elements of a theory of individual deprivation are essentially the den-
ition of income, the reference group, and an evaluation method. Again the
denition of income can be set aside, for the same reasons as in section 3.1.
The specication of the reference group can be based on intuition, on theories
from the social sciences, or on an explicit axiomatisation.
3.2.1 The Yitzhaki approach
The key insight for our purposes was provided by Yitzhaki (1979). With
hindsight this can be seen as a natural extension of one aspect of the Sen
approach to the structure of poverty. Yitzhaki originally specied his in-
dividual deprivation measure using a fairly general formulation. If x is an
individuals income and F is the distribution function for the economy in
question then, assuming that individuals are alike in all respects other than
income, the deprivation felt by someone with income x is
d (x) :=
Z 1
x
[1  F (y)] dy (9)
Expression (9) is equivalent to
d (x) =
Z 1
x
[y   x] dF (y) (10)
3The terms absolute and relative index are in quotes because both (7) and (8)
satisfy both scale and translation invariance in transformations of (x; z).
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In terms of the present notation, for a nite population (10) can be ex-
pressed as follows. Given the income distribution represented by the vector
x, the deprivation experienced by individual i is
di (x) =
1
n
nX
j=i+1
[xj   xi] (11)
Furthermore, dene the conditional mean
i(x) :=
1
n  i
nX
j=i+1
xj; (12)
where we note in passing that the conventional mean is given by 0(x). Then
(11) can be written equivalently as
di (x) =
n  i
n
[i(x)  xi] (13)
The individual deprivation index di (x) is evidently the counterpart to the
gapconcept (3) used in poverty analysis.
3.2.2 An axiomatic approach
However, the deprivation problem di¤ers from the poverty in one important
respect. The poverty line can be taken as exogenous information dening
the poverty problem, but there is no counterpart to that in the deprivation
problem. The poverty gap gi (x; z) from this denition and scarcely needs
axiomatisation  although in the Ebert and Moyes (2002) formulation it
follows immediately from Axiom 3. In the case of deprivation one either has
to assume (13) arbitrarily or nd an appropriate method of axiomatising it.
Nevertheless a suitable axiomatisation of gi () can be found using some of
the same structure as for the characterisation of poverty. Clearly the crucial
component of the problem is the denition of a reference group.
Ebert and Moyes (2000) provide an axiomatisation of individual depri-
vation whereby the index is to be dened for all logically possible reference
groups for a given N . As an alternative Bossert and DAmbrosio (2004) ax-
iomatise the Yitzhaki index using an approach that di¤ers from Ebert and
Moyes (2000) in the way the reference group of an individual is to be rep-
resented. Although it is otherwise similar to Ebert and Moyes (2000), some
of the other axioms in have to be modied or replaced as a result of this
alternative way of characterising the reference group.
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In the Bossert and DAmbrosio (2004) approach the reference group for
individual i is the better-thanset
Bi (x) = fj 2 N : xj > xig
Axiom 7 (Focus) For all x;y 2 D such that Bi (x) = Bi (y) and xj = yj
for all j 2 Bi (x) and xi = yi then
di (x) = di (y)
Axiom 8 (Normalisation) For all x2 D, and j 6= i such that xj = 1 and
xi = 0, i 6= j
di (x) =
1
n
Axiom 9 (Additive decomposition) For all x2 D, let B1, B2 be any two
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets of Bi (x) and dene vectors x1 and
x2 such that
xtj =

xi if i 2 Bt
xj otherwise
, t = 1; 2:
Then
di (x) = di
 
x1

+ di
 
x2

:
Then Bossert and DAmbrosio (2004) show:
Theorem 2 Axioms 7 to 9, along with Axioms 2, 3 for the case  = di, give
di (x) =
1
n
X
j2Bi(x)
[xj   xi]
The above expression is clearly the Yitzhaki index of individual depriva-
tion (11) again.
3.3 Aggregate deprivation
Now consider the required elements for an approach to a concept of aggregate
deprivation: clearly we need the denition of individual deprivation and an
aggregation method.
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3.3.1 A standard approach
Perhaps the most obvious way to derive a measure of aggregate deprivation
from the individual deprivation measures is just to add them up. Using the
Yitzhaki notation, suppose the deprivation experienced by a person with
income x is measured by (9) or (10). Writing (F ) for the mean of the
distribution given by the distribution function F , expressions (9) or 10) can
also be written as
(F )  x+ xq   C(F ; q) (14)
where
q = F (x)
and C is the income-cumulation function
C(F ; q) :=
Z q
0
x(t)dt:
Integrating (14) over the distribution F we get
=  
Z 1
0
C(F ; q)dq +
Z 1
0
x
Z x
0
dF (y)dF (x);
then the aggregated value of deprivation for the distribution F is
(F )  2
Z 1
0
C(F ; q)dq (15)
which is the absolute Gini. In terms of the notation of section 2 we would
have the simplied form of aggregate deprivation given by
1
n
nX
i=1
di(x) (16)
which, on rearrangement, gives (2).
The form (15) shows the close relationship between this interpretation of
deprivation and generalised-Lorenz rankings (Hey and Lambert 1980). Fi-
nally, note that (16) is an absolute index (because of translation invariance);
we can obviously convert it into a relative index by dividing by the mean,
in which case one gets the conventional Gini coe¢ cient, which exhibits scale
invariance and will decrease under uniform additions to all incomes.
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3.3.2 Extensions
However, it may be worth considering alternative forms of aggregation of
individual deprivation. In a manner similar to the Foster et al. (1984) aggre-
gation of poverty gaps, the deprivation index suggested by Chakravarty and
Chakraborty (1984) and developed further in Chakravarty and Mukherjee
(1999b) aggregates individual deprivation as follows:"
1
n
nX
i=1
widi(x)
"
# 1
"
(17)
where di(x) is given by (13), wi is the weight [1  i=n]1 " and "  1 is a
sensitivity parameter. A similar relative concept for aggregate deprivation
has been suggested by Chakravarty and Mukherjee (1999a):4
1 
"
1
n
nX
i=1

1  di(x)
0(x)
"# 1"
(18)
where 0(x) is the mean for the whole distribution.
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3.3.3 Relationship with Gini
The rôle of the Gini coe¢ cient in characterising deprivation has become
familiar in the literature. The fact that individualsrank is incorporated into
4DAmbrosio and Frick (2004) take the concept a stage further. They examine the
relationship between (a) relative deprivation/satisfaction, i.e. the gaps between the indi-
viduals income and the incomes of all individuals richer/poorer than him and (b) self-
reported level of satisfaction with income and life.
5The approach is similar to the paper by Duclos and Grégoire (2002) who use the
so-called S-Gini coe¢ cient in the specication of a class of poverty indices that combine
normative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. Their indices are distinguished
by a parameter that captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty measurement to exclusion
or relative-deprivationaversion. The connection with the Chakravarty approaches can
be seen if one writes the S-Gini as
1
n
nX
i=1
di (x)
0(x)
wi (v)
where the weights are given by
wi (v) := v [v   1]

1  i
n
v 2
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its denition can be seen as a natural interpretation of social disadvantage.6
However, a further lesson from the deprivation literature is the fundamental
importance of di¤erences a concept that underlies all the approaches7 and
is also central to the Gini coe¢ cient and the various types of generalised Gini
coe¢ cients. Furthermore the comparison between the poverty and relative
deprivation approaches clearly draws attention to the concept of reference
group and reference income, a point that is essential in the argument of
Section 4.
4 Complaints and income distribution
The philosopher Larry Temkin introduced an alternative way of perceiving
the income distribution in terms of inequality (Temkin 1986, 1993). Once
again the rôle of income di¤erences is central to the argument and it is
interesting to see how this alternative approach relates to the Gini-Lorenz
approach and to the analysis of deprivation considered in section 3.
4.1 The nature of complaints
4.1.1 Individual complaints
The fundamental concept required for the Temkin approach is that of an
individual agents complaint. Like the concept of deprivation examined in
Section 3.2 the Temkin concept of complaint can be naturally expressed in
terms of income di¤erences. But what di¤erences?8
6For other developments of the basic deprivation concept and its welfare interpretation
see Berrebi and Silber (1985, 1989), Chakravarty (1998), Chakravarty and Mukherjee
(1998), Stark and Yitzhaki (1988), Yitzhaki (1979, 1980, 1982).
7Podder (1996).provides an alternative approach to aggregate deprivation that does
not appear to use the basic structural axioms in that he examines utility comparisons
not income di¤erences. However, we can see this as the basic idea applied to a utility
transformation of income. The main idea is preserved if one just redenes D in terms of
the space of utilities. Likewise in Chakravarty and Moyes (2003) deprivation is formulated
in terms of utility rather than just in terms of income and they use this to examine the
incidence of taxation on the amount of deprivation felt in the society.
8Note that the complaint is not the same as the (dis)utility of deprivation, as in Podder
(1996) or Chakravarty and Moyes (2003). Rather, the complaint exists as an independent
entity:
To say that the best-o¤ have nothing to complain about is in no way to impugn their
moral sensibilities. They may be just as concerned about the inequality in their world as
anyone else. Nor is it to deny that, insofar as one is concerned about inequality, one might
have a complaint about them being as well o¤ as they are. It is only to recognize that,
since they are at least as well o¤ as every other member of their world, they have nothing
12
The answer to this again depends on the concept of the reference group.
Temkin identies three, each associated with a specic reference income level
 Best-o¤ person
 All those better o¤
 The average
We will examine the way each of these relates to the standard approaches
to inequality measurement and to the notions of deprivation discussed earlier.
4.1.2 Aggregate complaint
Temkin (1993) suggested two approaches, simple summation as we did for
the basic deprivation index or a weighted aggregation. We leave this ques-
tion open until we have considered the individual interpretations of com-
plaint.
4.2 Best-o¤ Person (BOP)
4.2.1 Axiomatic structure
Here individual {s complaint given the income distribution x is specied by
the di¤erence between {s income and that of the richest person:
ki (x) := xn   xi: (19)
Of course there may be more than one richest person; so it is useful to dene
r(x) as the lowest value of j 2 N such that xj = xn.
We can make the Temkin idea of complaint-based inequality specic by
characterisng the shape of a family of inequality measures, using the approach
of Cowell and Ebert (2004). Suppose the BOP-complaint version of the
Temkin inequality index is an evaluation function T . Then Cowell and Ebert
(2004) use the basic structural axioms given in section 2.2 (with  replaced
by T ) plus these:
Axiom 10 (Monotonicity) For x 2 D and i < r(x) T is strictly decreas-
ing in xi:
to complain about. Similarly, to say that the worst-o¤ have a complaint is not to claim
that they will in fact complain (they may not). It is only to recognize that it is a bad
thing (unjust or unfair) for them to be worse o¤ than the other members of their world
through no fault of their own(Temkin 1986, p.102).
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Axiom 11 (Independence) Let x, y 2 D be such that T (x) = T (y),
r(x) = r(y) = r > 2 and xr = yr. Then, for any i < r, xi = yi )
8 2 [xi 1; xi+1]\[yi 1; yi+1] and x i();y i() 2 D : T (x i()) = T (y i()) :
Axiom 12 (Normalisation) T (0; :::; 0; 1) = 1
Note the similarity of Axioms 10 and 11 to Axioms 5 and 6 in the analysis
of poverty. So a result similar to Theorem 1 emerges. Let 
n be the subset
of 
n such that xn 1 < xn there is a single richest person. Then, using the
topmost income xn as a reference point Cowell and Ebert (2004) show the
following for the two cases of the space of incomes:
Theorem 3 T satises Axioms 1 to 3 and 10 to 12 if and only if there are
wj > 0; j = 1; :::; n  1,
Pn 1
j=1 wj = 1 and " 2 R such that, for all x 2 D:
Case 1 (D = 
n)
T"(x) =
"
n 1X
j=1
wjkj(x)
"
# 1
"
for " 6= 0 (20)
=
n 1Y
j=1
kj(x)
wj for " = 0 (21)
Case 2 (D = 
n) Condition (20) holds and " > 0.
4.2.2 Inequality measures
The parameters w1; :::; wn 1 and " characterise the whole family of BOP-
complaint inequality indices. All of them satisfy the transfer principle (Dal-
ton 1920) if the the richest person is included in the income transfer but not
all will satisfy the transfer principle for an arbitrary pair of persons. However,
Cowell and Ebert (2004) also show:
Theorem 4 T" satises the transfer principle for any arbitrary pair of per-
sons if and only if
 wj+1  wj and " > 1 or
 wj+1 < wj and " = 1
14
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Contours for (a) Gini and (b) Temkin, " = 1; w1 = 0:75, w2 = 0:25.
To illustrate the relationship of this class to the familiar Gini coe¢ cient,
examine Figure 2 that depicts iso-inequality contour maps for the case n = 3
with a xed overall income level. Part (a) shows the contours for (absolute
or relative) Gini, as shown in Figure 1; part (b) shows the contour map
for one particular Temkin index that is clearly equivalent to those of the
extended-Gini as discussed in section 3.3.
4.2.3 Ranking
Apart from the behaviour of a typical complaint-inequality index it is natural
to consider how the concept of complaint may be used in providing a ranking
criterion. We need the counterpart to the Lorenz insight that is provided,
in the poverty context, by the TIP curve or poverty prole given in (5).
So, analogously, for any x 2 D we can dene the cumulation of complaints
recursively as
Ki(x) :=
iX
j=1
kj(x); i = 1; 2; :::; n (22)
This concept can be used to draw the cumulative complaint contour
(CCC) of a distribution x, formed by joining the points
 
i
n
; Ki(x)

and has
essentially the same properties as the TIP curve. If CCC(x) lies on or above
CCC(y) then distribution x exhibits more BOP-complaint inequality than
distribution y.9
9Chakravarty et al. (2003) introduce the idea of target shortfall orderings. Here one
associates with each income x a subgroup containing all persons whose incomes are not
15
To see what this means consider the subclass of BOP-complaint inequality
indices that satisfy the conventional transfer principle (see theorem 4 above).
Let T := T0 [ T1 where
T0 :=
(
T" : " > 1;
n 1X
j=1
wj = 1; wj  wj+1 > 0
)
T1 :=
(
T1 :
n 1X
j=1
wj = 1; wj > wj+1 > 0
)
There is a close relationship between this class T and an inequality-ranking
principle <T dened in terms of the complaint cumulations:
Denition 1 For any x;y 2 D distribution x exhibits more complaint-
inequality than y (x <T y) if and only if
Ki(x)  Ki(y) for i = 1; 2; :::; n
where Ki is given by (22).
Theorem 5 For any x;y 2 D: x <T y() T"(x)  T"(y), for all T" 2 T .
The proof reproduced in the appendix relies on the fact that one can
transform the CCC problem into one that is e¤ectively an income-cumulation
problem: the ranking<T is closely related to the standard generalised-Lorenz
ranking criterion <GL (Shorrocks 1983).
4.3 All those better o¤ (ATBO)
The analysis of Section 4.2 Theorem 3 can be adapted to the second type
of complaint where each individual uses as his reference point the average
income of all those who are better o¤. Unlike BOP the reference point is
di¤erent for each person. Using the conditional mean (12) one obtains the
ATBO-complaint as
ki (x) := i(x)  xi: (23)
This will generate a set of ATBO-complaint indices of the form (20, 21)
but with individual complaints ki given by (23) rather than (19). This is
clearly the ATBO counterpart of the family and is essentially the same as
the Chakravarty version of deprivation given by (17).10
higher than x and a persons target shortfall in a subgroup is the gap between the sub-
group highest income and his own income. They establish an absolute target shortfall
ordering, which, under constancy of population size and total income, implies the Lorenz
and CCC orderings.
10There is a supercial di¤erence in that the summation in (20) runs from 1 to n   1
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4.4 Average income (AVE)
For completeness let us also consider the possibility of AVE-complaint in-
equality indices. Here the reference point is 0(x), the mean for the whole
distribution. By analogy with (19) and (23) one now has
ki (x) := 0(x)  xi: (24)
as the individual complaintconcept. But, as Devooght (2003) has pointed
out, where incomes are greater than the mean, it is unclear what meaning is
to be given to complaint.Nevertheless, in this case the counterpart of (20,
21) is hPn
j=1wj jkj (x)j"
i 1
"
for " 6= 0;
Qn
j=1 jkj (x)jwj for " = 0:
9>=>; (25)
The family (25) is related to the Ebert (1988) class of inequality measures.
5 Conclusion
The focus of Ginis original contribution on income di¤erences is fundamen-
tal. This focus is now widely recognised not only in the analysis of deprivation
and of poverty but also in recent approaches to inequality that have incorpo-
rated the concept of complaint about income distribution. Likewise Lorenzs
contribution, so closely associated in the literature with Ginis work, is also
fundamental to recent contributions: a generalisation of the Lorenz ranking
works for both poverty orderings and complaint orderings.
Recent advances in the analysis of relative deprivation, poverty and com-
plaint inequality show that these separate problems share a common struc-
ture. As we have seen many of the same axioms are conventionally used
in the approach to characterising measures for each of the three problems.
However, they are not just an artefact of the methodology adopted by those
who have recently worked on the formalisation of these concepts. It is clear
from the original contributions in each of these areas that individual depri-
vation di, the individual poverty gap gi and individual complaint ki are all
examples of fundamental income di¤erences that lie at the heart of the think-
ing about these issues: indeed in many respects the indices that incorporate
the income-di¤erence concepts can be obtained from another with little more
whereas in (17) it is from 1 to n. However, given that complaint or deprivation is zero at
the top and that (17) restricts the value of ", this distinction is irrelevant.
17
than a change in notation. It is legitimate to see this modern body of work
as part of the intellectual legacy of Gini and Lorenz.
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A Proof of ranking result
First introduce the following lemma:
20
Lemma 1 For any x;y 2 D: x <T y() [y yn1] <GL [x xn1] :
Proof. By denition 1 we have
x <T y()
iX
j=1
[xn   xj] 
iX
j=1
[yn   yj] ; i = 1; 2; :::; n  1:
This is equivalent to
1
n
iX
j=1
[yj   yn]  1
n
iX
j=1
[xj   xn] ; i = 1; 2; :::; n (26)
which means that [y yn1] <GL [x xn1] :
This then enables us to establish Theorem 5.
Proof. Consider  T"() as a function of x xn1: it is clearly symmetric,
nondecreasing and concave in x xn1. So, using Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 of
Shorrocks (1983), we nd that x <T y implies
 T"(y)   T"(x):
Now consider a subfamily of indices with typical member T;i 2 T where
T;i(x) :=
n 1X
j=1
wj [xn   xj] (27)
wj =
8><>:
1
i
h
1  2j
[n 1][i+1]
i
for j = 1; :::; i
2[n j]
[n 1][n i][n i 1] for j = i+ 1; :::; n  1:
9>=>; (28)
Each T;i is an instance of the case " = 1 in (20). By assumption
T;i(x)  T;i(y); i = 1; :::; n  1: (29)
However from (27) and (28) we have
lim
!0
T;i(x) = Ki(x)
and so, letting ! 0, (29) implies
Ki(x)  Ki(y); i = 1; :::; n  1: (30)
Hence x <T y.
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